The Republican defeat in November’s US midterms has exposed a growing fault line within the MAGA movement over the Iran war, support for Benjamin Netanyahu, and the cost of America's relationship with Israel. The consequences could extend well beyond the next presidential election in 2028.
The Republican Party's crushing defeat in the November ‘Blue Tsunami’ has left President Trump's movement facing a very difficult question: has its traditionally unwavering support for Israel become an electoral liability?
Democrats have regained control of both the House and Senate, in an election that was largely shaped by voter dissatisfaction with Trump's presidency, the cost of living, and the war with Iran. An assessment, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, identified that the economy and the Iran War were among voters' most important concerns: 49% described the high cost of living as crucial to their voting, while 34% specifically said the same of the Iran War. And the two are, of course, connected via the Iranian stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz after Trump’s military action; an action, it has been argued, which was encouraged by the Israelis with the promise of a quick victory.
The conflict has proved particularly damaging because it cuts across Trump's original political agenda for his second term as president: to end America's involvement in foreign wars, prioritise the US economy and cost of living, and stop expending American blood and treasure on foreign interventions.
Instead, the US-Israeli strikes against Iran in 2025 - escalating to all-out war in 2026 - have drawn the US into a conflict that is looking like another ‘forever war.’ The ensuing disruption to energy and markets, pressure on household budgets, and mounting fears of an open-ended military commitment have reinforced the perception that America has once again become entangled in a foreign war without end. For critics of these actions, Netanyahu's determination to pursue his military objectives, and Trump's willingness to accommodate him, have made the Israeli alliance part of the range of problems facing the US. This has also exposed the inaccuracy of an assumption that support for Israel would remain an uncomplicated electoral advantage for the right; especially given the support for Israel among US evangelicals (a core component of Trump’s support base).
For Democrats, Israel had been a particularly difficult political issue. Bitter arguments over the Gaza War and Israeli West Bank settlement expansion had created divisions between the party's traditional pro-Israel leadership and its ‘progressive’ left wing. Democrat candidates critical of Israeli policies faced accusations of antisemitism, sometimes extending to Muslim politicians themselves in a GOP campaign which seemed focused on their religion. Michigan’s Democrat senatorial candidate, Abdul El-Sayed, for example, became a particular focus of controversy (and GOP attack-ads) over his criticisms of Israeli policy.
However, the electoral evidence contradicts the assumption (before the midterms) that Jewish voters would abandon the Democrats. A national NBC exit poll found that 68% of Jewish voters voted Democrat in 2026, against 31% for Republicans. That represents a decline from the 78% who backed Harris in the 2024 presidential election, but Democrats still won a substantial majority of these votes. Even in Michigan, polling indicates that El-Sayed retained significant (though reduced) support among Jewish voters despite his outspoken condemnation of the policies of Netanyahu. These results indicate that Democrat opposition to current Israeli government policy does not automatically translate into rejection of Democratic candidates by US Jewish voters, or that criticism of Israel should automatically be equated with antisemitism (as has been frequently alleged).
More significant for the longer term is the apparent generational change in US attitudes towards Israel accelerated by the Gaza War and Iran War. A Pew Research Center survey (Spring 2026) found that 60% of Americans viewed Israel unfavourably, compared with 53% in 2025. Among younger Republicans (aged 18-49), 57% held an unfavourable view, against 41% of Republicans overall. In this survey White evangelical Protestants (not differentiated by age) had mostly positive views of Israel, at 65%. Yale’s 2026 Youth Poll found that 55% of voters aged 18-22 agreed with a strongly critical statement about American deference to Israel, compared with 35% of voters overall.
It seems clear that, measured by age, political tectonic plates are shifting in the USA. Opposition to the humanitarian consequences of Israeli military operations in Gaza, frustration with Netanyahu's policies, combined with reluctance to see US taxpayers finance another regional conflict are arguably increasingly important causal factors in this shift. This criticism of Israeli policies is not the same as hostility towards Jewish people; although such opposition can, in some cases, become antisemitic.
The Republican response has been revealing. In a November 4th post, Vice President J.D. Vance identified four priorities for regaining the trust of disillusioned Trump voters: (1) ending the Iran war, (2) tackling inflation, (3) putting America first and (4) changing the US relationship with Israel. Points (1) and (4) are connected and the last point is highly significant coming from high up in the GOP. Ex-Trump supporters and MAGA members, Tucker Carlson and former congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene have also broken with the administration over the intervention in Iran (in alliance with Israel), arguing that Republican leaders have abandoned their promises to prioritise American interests and avoid foreign wars.
This has raised a challenging question: why should US taxpayers finance military operations in the Iran War costing $47.1 billion to $48.9 billion as of October/November 2026, according to official Pentagon estimates submitted to Congress and independent trackers? And this as domestic impacts of this increase. To critics this appears to serve Netanyahu's political and strategic priorities rather than those of the US.
Could this produce a fundamental change in American foreign policy?
Potentially so, although a wholesale break with Israel remains highly unlikely. Since 1948, successive Republican and Democratic administrations have treated Israel as a key strategic partner and this congressional support has been reinforced by joint intelligence cooperation, regional security interests and longstanding political connections.
There is also a powerful economic dimension to this. US military assistance benefits US defence contractors and supports employment in congressional districts which are dependent on arms manufacturing. Cutting aid to Israel could, as a consequence, create domestic political problems among Republicans who are otherwise sympathetic to Vance’s position regarding foreign interventions more generally.
A more likely outcome is a change in the terms of the alliance. While the traditional pro-Israel conservatives (including most US evangelicals) will resist restrictions on military assistance to Israel - for a combination of geopolitical and theological reasons - the ‘America First’ faction will undoubtedly demand greater scrutiny of military aid costs, opposition to further wars, and an end to what it regards as Netanyahu's disproportionate influence over Trump.
The 2026 midterms have demonstrated that Israel is no longer an issue on which Republican politicians can assume a broad level of agreement within their coalition. MAGA is splintering over it. For ambitious politicians such as Vance, the challenge that they face is to turn that dissatisfaction into a coherent foreign policy alternative that does not alienate traditional Republicans. For the GOP, a big question is whether putting ‘America First’ means imposing limits on its oldest Middle Eastern alliance?
Martyn Whittock is an historian and a Licensed Lay Minister in the Church of England. The author, or co-author, of fifty-eight books, his work covers a wide range of historical and theological themes. His recent books, exploring how ‘deep stories’ influence later community identities, include Trump and the Puritans. How the evangelical religious right put Donald Trump in the White House (2020), American Vikings. How the Norse Sailed into the Lands and Imaginations of America (2023) and Vikings in the East. From Vladimir the Great to Vladimir Putin (2025).
