It’s been four and a half years since Russia began its “special military operation” or “full-scale invasion” in Ukraine and there is still no end in sight.
At the heart of the conflict arguably stands the question of Ukraine’s identity. Is it inseparably connected to Russia by centuries of blood and history, or is it a free entity, able to pick its own course?
This question is also being played out in microcosm in the relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox churches.
Prior to Russia’s invasion in 2022 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), while mostly self-governing, was canonically part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).
However, in May 2022 the UOC broke away from the ROC due to the latter’s support for the war. The ROC has not accepted the legitimacy of this breakaway action, arguing that proper canonical procedures were not followed.
The following month the ROC took over the management of all UOC churches and monasteries in the Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. The Ukrainian government has not accepted the legitimacy of the annexation.
The subsequent ecclesiastical annexation was apparently done with the support of Crimea’s UOC leadership, with the diocesan bishops appealing to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow to transfer jurisdiction of the Crimean churches to the ROC.
In total 334 churches and 15 monasteries were moved from the jurisdiction of the UOC to the ROC.
In 2014 the Russian annexation was apparently confirmed in a referendum in which 97 per cent voted in favour of uniting with Russia, although the legitimacy of the election has been disputed.
Relations with Russia remain a key issue for churches in Ukraine. The UOC exists alongside an entirely new denomination, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which was founded in 2018 and has never been in communion with the ROC.
The Ukrainian government has been more favourable towards the OCU due to its lack of historic Russian connections. By contrast, despite denouncing the war and distancing itself from Moscow, the Ukrainian government has remained suspicious of the UOC, occasionally arresting its clergy and passing a law in 2024 banning religious groups affiliated with Russia.
Whether the separation between the churches proves to be temporary or permanent remains to be seen. What is clear is that the war has transformed a long-standing ecclesiastical relationship into another arena in which the competing visions of Ukraine's future are being contested.
Willy Fautré, Director of Human Rights Without Frontiers, described the UOC as being in the "crosshairs of the state".
"What might be next for the UOC? Complaints at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, at the Council of Europe and at the United Nations, through its various mechanisms, such as the Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Religion or Belief? Time will tell," he said.
